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One of the most striking features of Asia‟s increasingly important position in the global economy is 
the region‟s crucial role in the international shipbuilding market. Today, more than 90 per cent of 
the world‟s orders for new ships have been placed with Asian yards, more specifically with 
shipbuilders in China, Japan and South Korea. Although Japan became the world‟s leading 
shipbuilding nation in 1956, European yards still held a market share of around 75 per cent at that 
time. Subsequently competition from Japan, then from South Korea and latterly from China, first 
seriously eroded and then ended Europe‟s once leading position. Whereas the declining fortunes of 
the European shipbuilding industry – and to some extent the rise of Japan – have been well-covered 
in the literature, the rise of South Korea has received little attention.1  
This paper looks at the formative period of South Korean shipbuilding, the period from 1970 
to 1990, which appears to be an unlikely time for the escalation of shipbuilding activities. The 
period was dominated by a major crisis in world shipping and shipbuilding, and saw massive yard 
closures in Europe. Our main question is: how did South Korean yards manage to build up a 
substantial market share in a period where the shipbuilding industry was in distress? Our 
explanations are based on both international and domestic factors, with specific emphasis on the 
role of policies and technological learning. 
There is a substantial body of literature looking at the promotion of the heavy and chemical 
industries (HCIs) in South Korea, but few studies have focused solely on shipbuilding. Cho and Porter 
(1986) looked at the entrance of South Korea in the world shipbuilding market and emphasised the 
high entry and exit barriers as one of the causes of the high state involvement. Amsden (1989) used 
a case study of Hyundai Heavy Industry (HHI), which was the main South Korean company exporting 
ships during the 1970s, to analyse the breakthrough of the country‟s shipbuilding in the 
international market. The most comprehensive analysis of South Korean shipbuilding is the 
                                                 
1 The overall shift in shipbuilding market shares is eminently discussed in Todd (1991); for a more concise 
analysis, see Cho and Porter (1986). More comprehensive presentations of the decline of European shipbuilding 
can be found in for instance Stråth (1987) and, focussing on the UK, Johnman & Murphy (2002). The rise of 
Japan is covered by Chida and Davies (1990), which also analyses the role of Japanese shipping. With regard to 
the growth of the South Korean shipbuilding industry, two works stand out: Amsden (1989) and Jonsson (1995).  
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comparative study by Jonsson (1995), where the country‟s experience is compared with the 
developments in Japan, the United Kingdom and Sweden. 
The three studies mentioned above emphasise four factors that enabled South Korea to 
become an important provider of newbuildings: (i) government support, (ii) low labour costs and the 
repression of labour, (iii) favourable access to international and domestic funds and (iv) assistance 
in technology transfer.2 This paper adds to the literature by introducing two new dimensions. First, 
we put the development of South Korean shipbuilding into a wider international context. Second, 
we address the question whether the difficult conditions in the markets for ships and shipbuilding 
may in fact have been an advantage for the ascendancy of South Korean shipyards. 
The first part of the paper presents the main features of the development in South Korean 
and international shipbuilding in the period 1970-90, before giving a brief introduction to the shifts 
in hegemony within shipbuilding. The second part looks more closely at the international dimension 
of South Korea‟s ascent, in particular the basis for growth in what was for all practical purposes “a 
sunset industry”.3 The third part analyses domestic factors that can explain the growing South 
Korean market share, emphasising the interplay between comparative advantages and the industrial 
policy. Moreover, we discuss in more detail how the prime movers in South Korean shipbuilding 
managed to obtain the technological and organisational know-how necessary to succeed. Finally, we 
discuss explicitly to which extent the plight of the yards in traditional shipbuilding nations might 
have been to the benefit of the South Korean shipbuilding industry. 
1. South Korean and world shipbuilding, 1970-90 
South Korea‟s advance in the international shipbuilding industry in the period 1970-90 was 
spectacular. The period was turbulent, as the crisis in the shipping sector led to a dramatic decline 
in the demand for new tonnage from the middle of the 1970s onwards, sparking a global 
shipbuilding slump. The response in Western European countries was based on a number of 
ingredients; nationalization, rationalization, subsidization, specialization and, ultimately, massive 
disinvestment and downscaling. By 1990 the Western European merchant ship completions had been 
reduced by around 75 per cent relative to the mid-1970s‟ peak – from more than twelve million 
gross register tons (grt) in 1975 to less than three million grt in 1990. The South Korean completions 
on the other hand multiplied by a factor of more than eight over the same period.4 Indeed, while 
South Korea‟s production in 1975 was less than a sixth of West Germany‟s production, by 1990 its 
output was larger than that of all European yards in aggregate. 
 The crisis of the 1970s and 1980s was a watershed in the postwar shipping market. As a 
result of the OPEC oil price increases, the rapid growth of tanker demand was replaced by 
stagnation and then absolute reduction. When the market collapsed, there was a substantial 
overhang of ordered, non-delivered vessels, and the second half of the 1970s and first half of the 
1980s were characterised by overcapacity, substantial lay-ups and a massive reduction in the 
amount of new tonnage launched.5 As a result of huge demand for new shipping tonnage and long 
                                                 
2 One point of disagreement is the relative importance of the pre-1973 era for the subsequent expansion of the 
South Korean shipbuilding industry. Amsden (1989) claims the legacy of the 1960s was of minor importance 
apart from the supply of skilled workers from the Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering Corporation (KSEC). 
Jonsson (1995), on the other hand, claims that the failed attempts to promote shipbuilding in the 1960s gave 
vital lessons for the policymakers, and could potentially be a source of learning-by-doing. 
3 Oakes (1986:19). 
4 Unless otherwise stated, data on shipbuilding are taken from Lloyd’s Statistical Tables, various years, and 
refer to vessels completed, measured in gross register tons. 
5 See Tenold (2006) for the basis for the shipping crisis and an overview of the problematic period 1973-87.  
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orderbooks, the production capacity of the world‟s yards had increased tremendously in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Ironically, when the production capacity had reached a historically high 
volume, the market collapsed. 
Problems in the shipping industry rapidly spill over to the shipbuilding sector. As a result of 
the strong growth of the fleet before the freight market breakdown, from 1974 onwards new orders 
were virtually absent and large amounts of tonnage on order was cancelled. Chart 1 shows the 
fluctuations in the tonnage completed in the period 1969-1990, as well as South Korea‟s increasing 
market share. The more than ten year glut and the South Korean shipyards‟ massive expansion 
during this period are evident from the data. 
Chart 1. Tonnage completed (million grt) and South Korea‟s share (per cent), 1969-1989 
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The basis for South Korea‟s growth in the international shipbuilding market should be sought in a 
combination of international and domestic elements. Although these two factors are closely 
intertwined, the rest of this paper is organised by looking at the two factors separately. However, 
we initially indicate why we think it is necessary to take both aspects into account, and why we 
have taken a “two-stage” approach in our analysis, where we look at international factors before 
we consider the domestic dimension. 
 Few sectors are as “international” in their character as the shipping industry. However, this 
does not automatically imply that the market for ships has the same international properties. There 
are some examples, with the United States as the most noteworthy, of strong protectionist links 
between the domestic shipping and shipbuilding industries. However, the majority of shipowners 
sell their services in a global market, where the nationality of the service provider for all practical 
purposes is irrelevant. Furthermore, most shipowners purchase their ships in an international 
market as well, either as second-hand ships or as newbuildings. While there are some links between 
shipping and shipbuilding at the national level, this is far more important with regard to for instance 
warshipbuilding, than with regard to merchant shipping. 
 The fact that the shipyards‟ customer base is international does not imply that this is a 
market where the influence of national governments is unimportant. On the contrary, governments 
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in all major shipbuilding nations have interfered with the market mechanism, providing direct 
subsidies, easy financing, preferential orders, etc.6 Thus, while the state of the market at the 
international level is undoubtedly important, the domestic dimension has to be considered in order 
to fully understand the rise and fall of shipbuilding nations. Conditions in the international market 
determine the room to manoeuvre, but domestic policies and possibilities determine the actual 
movement.  
 Table 1 is a schematic presentation of the factors underlying the ascendancy of the three 
nations that have been leaders within world shipbuilding. This table is a testament to the relative 
strength of the dominant shipbuilding nations across time. Since the second half of the 19th century 
there have only been three market leaders in peace-time: Great Britain, Japan and South Korea.7 
However, the factors on which their position was based varied along several dimensions. The table 
presents the elements that were of particular importance during the periods in which the countries 
gained large market shares. As the shipbuilding industry matured, other factors gained prominence. 
Table 1. Perceived advantages of leading shipbuilders during their initial period of growth 
 
1850s-1880s 
Great Britain 
1950s-1970s 
Japan 
1970s onnwards 
South Korea 
Demand factors    
Shipping market Booming Booming Volatile 
Shipbuilding market Increasing Increasing Declining (temporarily) 
Market focus Domestic Initially domestic Export market 
Supply factors    
Relative labour costs High Low Low 
Labour unions Limited Repressed Repressed 
Technology Domestic Foreign Foreign 
Resources Iron and coal Steel Steel 
State support Limited (indirect) Yes Yes 
 
Considering the demand factors, both Great Britain and Japan established their positions in periods 
where the demand for shipping services and ships was growing rapidly, while the South Korean 
progress occurred under more difficult demand conditions. Moreover, while British yards had the 
advantage of a large home market and Japan used domestic owners as a base for subsequent export 
orders, the South Koreans relied on foreign demand. 
 The differences are evident when we look at the supply factors as well, although here the 
two Asian nations share the same properties, though with different timing. Great Britain‟s 
supremacy was built on bespoke production, entailing relatively high labour costs, but initially 
                                                 
6 Stråth (1987:14) refers to the wealth of government efforts to secure shipbuilding activity as “the „obscure 
jungle‟ of subsidies”. 
7 The role of US shipbuilding during periods of war, and their immediate aftermath, should of course be 
mentioned. However, when we consider only periods of uninterrupted market conditions, the triumvirate 
above have an impressive pedigree. The UK was the world‟s main shipbuilder from the mid 19th century until 
the late 1950s, before Japan established the dominant position that it held until it was eclipsed by South Korea 
around the turn of the millennium. Exactly when South Korea overtook Japan, depends on the measure used; 
gross tonnage, compensated gross tonnage, tonnage launched, tonnage completed or the size of the orderbook. 
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occurred in a period where labour unionism was limited. Great Britain‟s dominance within 
shipbuilding technology and marine engineering gave an advantage that was enhanced by abundant 
supply of iron and coal. The direct state support was very limited, compared with the postwar 
period, but there is no doubt that the role of the Empire, and the country‟s position in international 
trade had important indirect effects. Moreover, postal subventions and Admiralty support also 
helped British shipbuilding (Johnman & Murphy, 2002:1).   
 The initial phases of Japanese and South Korean shipbuilding growth were characterised by 
relatively low wages and repressed labour unions. Moreover, production technology was “imported” 
from abroad – and only subsequently refined – while the role of the state was substantial. In both 
countries the authorities had detailed plans for the expansion of the industry, working closely with 
major business interests to ensure that the goals were met. 
2. The international development 
Chart 1 painted a gloomy picture of the amount of tonnage completed, and showed the massive 
increase of South Korean market shares over the period 1969-1989. The world shipbuilding glut 
weighed down the industry, affecting all major shipbuilding nations adversely. Chart 2 shows the 
development of output in the most important shipbuilding countries.8 The chart presents the 
production at five year intervals. The output is measured as a percentage of production during the 
best year of the period, which is indicated next to the legend for each country. 
Chart 2. Tonnage completed, per cent of year with highest production9 
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8 All nations that at some time during the period 1970-1990 completed more than one million grt within a year 
are included in the data. The exception is the United States, the shipbuilding industry of which is more or less 
detached from the global market. 
9 As the dates for the peak production shows, there was a lag from the breakdown of the shipping market 
(1973-74) to the drop in shipbuilding production, as a result of the substantial amount of newbuildings ordered 
before the market collapsed. 
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Chart 2 illustrates the varying fortunes of shipbuilding in the European countries. Some countries – 
France, Norway, Sweden and the UK – reached a peak in the mid 1970s, after which shipbuilding fell 
by 90 per cent or more.10 The Netherlands and Spain experienced lower, but still substantial, 
decline. Only Denmark, Germany and Japan saw acceptable production figures, at least in relative 
terms, though even here output in 1990 amounted to as little as 35 to 40 per cent of the peak 
production. The odd one out is, of course, South Korea, which had very limited shipbuilding activity 
in 1970, but continued to expand the capacity and production. 
 The massive decline of shipbuilding happened in spite of substantial efforts at maintaining 
production in all shipbuilding countries. A huge arsenal of support was employed; financial credits 
and direct transfers to yards and shipowners, tax concessions, new equity from state funds, large 
naval and other public orders, etc.  Nevertheless, the forces of the market were so strong, and the 
overcapacity so large, that a downscaling of the industry had to take place. Intuitively, this makes 
South Korea‟s performance even more remarkable. However, as we will argue later, South Korea 
might have had some benefits from entering a sector in which the market mechanism was strangled 
and a return to “normalcy” appeared impossible.   
Table 2 gives an overview of some of the support measures put in place to secure 
employment at the yards in the major shipbuilding countries. In addition to the nation-specific 
measures mentioned below, a conspicuous element in all Western European countries and Japan 
was the closure of several yards, capacity reduction in others and massive lay-offs all around. More 
than a hundred yards were closed, and employment was halved in Western Europe and Japan 
between 1975 and 1987.11 In 1975 more than 325,000 people had been employed at shipyards in 
Western Europe. By 1983 the figure was down to around 155,000.12 There was a substantial 
reduction of employment in Japan as well, from 150,000 in 1975 to 85,000 in 1983.13   
                                                 
10 The apparently consistent decline of the UK output in the chart is misleading; in 1976 the country completed 
more tonnage than in 1970. 
11 Stopford (2004). 
12 Data from Institute of Shipping Economics (1984a:47). Considering shipbuilding only, and excluding ship 
repair and conversion, employment in the EU countries declined from 209,000 in 1975 to 65,700 in 1991; see 
Glen (2006:5). 
13 The Japanese data refer to the members of the Shipbuilding Association of Japan, which includes the 23 
leading shipbuilding companies.  
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Table 2. Production 1975 and 1990 (thousand grt) and strategic support measures14 
 1975 1990 Change Strategic measures 
Denmark 969 407 -58% Tax concessions, owners‟ orders 
France 1,149 63 -95% Massive subsidies, bankruptcies, specialization 
Germany 2,499 874 -65% Restructuring, mergers, state owners, naval orders 
The Netherlands 1,028 184 -82% Massive subsidies, the RSV-scandal 
Norway 1,052 88 -92% Offshore focus, subsidies, specialization 
Spain 1,593 367 -76% Restructuring, nationalization, naval orders 
Sweden 2,188 27 -99% Subsidies, nationalization, full withdrawal  
United Kingdom 1,169 127 -89% Nationalization, privatization, naval orders 
Japan 16,991 6,661 -61% Rationalization, cross-subsidization 
South Korea 410 3,440 +740% Capacity increase, state support 
World 34,203 15,995 -53%  
 
Most of the support measures were futile and only contributed to prolonging the decline of 
European shipbuilding. The fundamental problem, lack of competitiveness, was not properly 
addressed. European costs, in particular wages, were too high, and the strategic measures did not 
lead to a sufficiently large improvement in productivity and production costs. The by far most 
persistent competitor was South Korea, but it was not the only developing country making a specific 
effort at expanding their shipbuilding activities; Brazil and Taiwan also tried to break into the 
market. In 1979 and 1980, the output of Brazilian shipyards even exceeded that of South Korea. 
Chart 3. New competitors: tonnage completed in Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan, 1970-90 
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The Brazilian drive, primarily based on a system of direct intervention in shipbuilding contracts and 
guaranteed domestic orders that led to a substantial increase in output during the 1970s, imploded 
                                                 
14 For a concise introduction to strategic measures in various European countries, see for instance Oakes 
(1986). For development in individual countries, see Poulsen & Sornn-Friese (2010) for Denmark, de Voogd 
(2007) for Germany and The Netherlands and Johnman & Murphy (2002) for the UK.  
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in the first half of the 1980s: “The shipbuilding industry is now almost totally idle”.15 Taiwan turned 
out to be a more viable competitor, though never managed to get the kind of market shares that 
the South Korean yards gained. The basis for the emergence of the three developing country 
producers was more or less the same; an initial focus on price competitiveness, helped by strong 
governmental support. However, South Korean shipbuilders appear to have succeeded better in the 
second phase of the shipbuilding drive, when low wages could no longer be the only means of 
competition.  
The competitive costs of South Korean and Taiwanese yards, and the low productivity of 
Brazilian shipyards, are evident from Table 3. The table is based on data on production, measured 
as compensated gross tonnage (cgt), which take into account variations in the amount of labour 
necessary to construct different kinds of vessels. The table, which is based on data for production 
and employment for the years 1979-81, coupled with the compensation per worker in 1982, shows 
the dramatic differences in productivity among the countries competing in the market for new 
ships. For instance, the average shipyard worker in the United Kingdom produced only marginally 
more than the average South Korean, but received more than three times as much in compensation.  
 
Table 3. Productivity – annual output and compensation, 198216 
 Output cgt Workforce Output/worker Comp./worker  Comp./ cgrt 
Northern Ireland 47,625 5,769 8.26 11,451 1387 
Belgium 119,917 5,904 20.31 21,860 1076 
Brazil 398,333 30,000 13.28 12,800 964 
Great Britain 355,414 20,982 16.94 14,039 829 
Portugal 62,808 9,233 6.80 5,524 812 
Italy 239,370 14,483 16.53 13,313 805 
Germany 719,334 24,819 28.98 20,079 693 
Denmark 279,836 10,127 27.63 18,577 672 
AWES 4,427,142 194,697 22.74 15,130 665 
France 434,709 17,067 25.47 16,543 649 
Spain 557,082 33,507 16.63 10,665 641 
Norway 436,318 14,480 30.13 18,548 616 
Finland 464,739 16,600 28.00 14,860 531 
Sweden 409,708 12,300 33.31 17,478 525 
Netherlands 300,282 9,426 31.86 16,384 514 
Taiwan 148,924 12,000 12.41 5,185 418 
Japan 4,461,282 115,598 38.59 15,209 394 
Poland 405,688 43,650 9.29 3,190 343 
South Korea 469,200 31,053 15.11 4,600 304 
    
                                                 
15 Pires (2001:157). 
16 AWES refers to the member countries of the Association of West-European Shipbuilders. Data from 
Nederlands Economisch Instituut reprinted in Institute of Shipping Economics (1984b), 47. 
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There is no doubt that South Korea‟s position as a low cost provider of new tonnage was crucial to 
the country‟s growing share of the world market for ships. According to Graham Day, CEO of British 
Shipbuilders: “if for example you or I were an independent shipowner, and we had communication 
from, say, a Japanese shipbuilder that said the price was 10, all you would have to do is produce 
that to a South Korean yard and they will bid 9 without looking at the specification or anything 
else.”17  
By the mid 1980s, South Korea had become the most important competitor to the Japanese 
in the high-volume shipbuilding market. Some European yards had chosen to focus on more 
advanced purpose-built vessels, but in aggregate the European shipbuilding capacity had been 
dramatically reduced. For the largest vessels, it was now more or less a two-horse race between 
Japan and South Korea. In the mid 1980s the currency development improved South Korea‟s 
competitiveness even further. As a result of the appreciation of the yen, the advantages related to 
higher productivity in Japanese yards were eroded; “the price differential with the [South] Koreans 
this time a year ago was between 5-10%. Now, though, since the won is linked to the dollar, the gap 
is anything up to 50%”18 
In the last part of the 1980s, however, the South Korean expansion lost some steam. Rising 
labour costs, labour conflicts and uncertainty in connection with the transition to democracy all 
affected the country‟s shipbuilding sector negatively.19 Nevertheless, there is no doubt that South 
Korea by the beginning of the 1980s had come a long way from the meagre starting point at the 
beginning of the 1970s. During that decade, South Korean shipbuilding developed from a sheltered, 
domestically oriented industry to an important challenger in the world market. Table 4 shows the 
transition of the country‟s shipbuilding industry from 1971 to 1981. 
Table 4. Shipbuilding capacity, South Korea 1971 and 198120 
      1971 1981 
Shipbuilding capacity (grt)  190,000  4,000,000 
Domestic demand (grt) 43,000 193,000 
Export demand (grt) - 880,000 
Shipbuilding companies 131 153 
 
Table 4 indicates that by 1981 there was substantial surplus capacity in the South Korean 
shipbuilding industry. During the 1980s, as a result of demand for new ships recovering, the 
overcapacity was substantially reduced, even though production capacity was further increased. 
This enabled South Korea to develop from an important challenger to the world‟s second largest 
shipbuilding nation. Table 5 shows that Hyundai, the first company to properly enter the world 
market, had been followed by several other yards, most of which had an impressive orderbook 
based primarily on foreign demand.  
                                                 
17 Johnman & Murphy (2002:231). 
18 Bartlett & Asami (1986:133). 
19 Lloyd’s Shipping Economist (1988:14). 
20 Institute of Shipping Economics (1981:52). 
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Table 5. Orderbook by shipyard, end of 199021 
 Domestic # Domestic grt Export # Export grt Export share Avg. Size 
Hyundai 0 0 45 3003.5 100 66,744 
Daewoo 2 72 21 2753.9 97.45 122,865 
Hanjin 4 155 4 208.9 57.41 45,488 
Samsung 0 0 14 802.6 100 57,329 
Tacoma 1 0.4 1 0.1 20 250 
Donghae 1 5.7 6 18.9 76.83 3,514 
Dae Dong 2 2.5 3 7.5 75 2,000 
Daesun 6 8.4 2 0.8 8.70 1,150 
Shin-A 4 5.4 0 0 0 1,350 
Halla 0 0 8 216 100 27,000 
Others 0 0 20 3.6 100 180 
Sum 20 249.4 124 7015.8 96.6 50,453 
 
South Korea‟s position at the end of the 1980s was vastly different from only ten years earlier. The 
country‟s international market share had increased further, but the competitive position had been 
changed as well. In the late 1980s currency developments worked against the South Korean yards, 
and labour costs increased in tandem with rising living standards. Indeed, by 1989 the competitive 
position of the country‟s shipbuilding industry had changed: “South Korea has now entered the ranks 
of the high quality-high cost shipbuilding nations, competing on direct terms with Japan.”22  
 In the last part of the paper we will discuss to which extent the problematic conditions in 
the world shipbuilding industry might have been beneficial for South Korea. However, before that, 
it is necessary to look more closely at the domestic factors that made the massive inroads into the 
international market possible. 
3. The domestic development 
The presentation of the international development has shown South Korea‟s rapid ascent towards 
the top of the world‟s shipbuilders. To explain this ascendancy, domestic developments are 
important. Specifically, we deal with two aspects of South Korean shipbuilding: the role of 
industrial policy and the improvement of skills through technological learning. First, however, we 
will give a brief introduction to some of the important development trends in South Korean 
shipbuilding in the period 1970-1990 and the government‟s motives for promoting the shipbuilding 
industry. 
 South Korea‟s starting point was, as we saw from the previous section, meagre. Although 
the country had more than a hundred shipyards in the 1960s, only nine of these were producing 
steel vessels.23 In 1970 the country had one major yard, the Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Corporation (KSEC). The yard received orders for six tankers in the 20-30,000 ton range from Gulf 
                                                 
21 Data from Institute of Shipping Economics (1991:75). Tonnage refers to 1000 grt. 
22 Lloyd’s Shipping Economist (1989:12). 
23 Our presentation of the early shipbuilding industry in South Korea draws heavily upon Jonsson (1995). 
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Oil in 1970 and 1971.24 Although KSEC through these orders were responsible for South Korea‟s first 
stab at the international market for ships, the real expansion was to come elsewhere. Rather than 
the state-owned KSEC, Hyundai, one of the leading chaebol (business conglomerates) would become 
the vehicle for South Korea‟s expansion. 
Hyundai was instrumental in the ascendancy of South Korea‟s shipbuilding, but at the same 
time dependent on state support. Hyundai Construction Company (HCC) applied for a licence to 
construct ships in June 1970 and the government subsequently approved it in September the same 
year.25 The construction of Hyundai‟s huge shipyard at Ulsan commenced in March 1972 and was 
completed in June 1974.26 HCC established the shipbuilding company Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) 
on March the 23rd 1972.27 The establishment and early operations of HHI depended upon state 
support, the full extent of which we will elaborate on below. In brief, the state supported HHI by (i) 
giving access to domestic and foreign funds with preferential interest rates; (ii) helping in obtaining 
and providing financial guarantees for the first order; (iii) making complementary investments in 
facilities and complementary industries, such as steel through the Pohang Iron and Steel Company 
(POSCO); and (iv) providing support for acquiring new technologies. HHI became the major 
shipbuilder in South Korea in the 1970s and became the world‟s leading shipbuilder in 1983, a 
position it still holds today. 
State support was vital for Huyndai‟s foray into shipbuilding, as well as for their followers 
Daewoo and Samsung. In December 1978 the Daewoo group took over a shipyard at Okp‟o which was 
originally built by KSEC with a planned capacity of 1.2 million grt. KSEC had to delay the building of 
the shipyard because of depressed market conditions and the shipyard was delayed until October 
1978. The Okp‟o shipyard was only 25 % completed in December 1978, and following complementary 
investments by Daewoo the shipyard was finally finished in January 1981 (Jonsson, 1995:82). 
Samsung entered the shipbuilding market in similar fashion, acquiring Geoje Shipyard through the 
purchase of Koryô Shipbuilding. The latter company was originally founded in March 1974 and 
started the construction of a planned 150.000 grt shipyard in December the same year. Koryô 
Shipbuilding was struggling to get a foothold in the market and in April 1977 Samsung purchased the 
company, with operations at the Geoje shipyard starting in September 1979. 
Table 6 shows the production of the four big shipyards from 1973 to 1986. There is a large 
Hyundai dominance in the 1970s, while Daewoo and Samsung increase their market shares in the 
1980s. In the crucial years from 1979-85 production increased more than five-fold from 555,639 tons 
in 1979 to 2,813,920 tons in 1985, marking South Korea‟s transition from being a developing 
shipbuilder to being a large market player, as seen in chart 3. South Korean shipyards, especially 
the big four, were in a favourable position to exploit the short-lived international boom in 1979-80 
to fill their orderbooks. 
                                                 
24 Nam (2009:201). 
25 Jonsson (1995:79). 
26 South Korea‟s total production capacity measured in grt increased from 187,000 ton in 1970 to 250,000 ton in 
1973; which was followed by huge leaps to 1,100,000 ton in 1974 and 2,390,000 ton in 1975 (Jonsson 1995:78). 
27 According to HHI home page; http://english.hhi.co.kr/company/at_a_glance.asp. However, according to 
HHI‟s annual report in 2009 it was established in 1973. 
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Table 6.  Principal shipbuilders‟ production (grt) 1973-1986.28 
Year Hyundai KSEC Daewoo Samsung Big four (BF) Total BF/Total 
1973 126,000 2,980 0 0 128,980 163,474 78.9 % 
1974 451,700 2,980 0 0 454,680 561,870 80.9 % 
1975 512,000 75,400 0 0 587,400 612,460 95.9 % 
1976 573,500 52,450 0 0 625,950 683,973 91.5 % 
1977 505,568 76,322 0 0 581,890 648,523 89.7 % 
1978 614,790 116,694 0 0 731,484 775,800 94.3 % 
1979 383,763 103,060 0 0 486,823 555,639 87.6 % 
1980 518,565 60,448 0 13,858 592,871 684,931 86.6 % 
1981 907,040 137,655 21,500 52,000 1,118,195 1,219,932 91.7 % 
1982 861,206 186,988 148,329 126,000 1,322,523 1,479,367 89.4 % 
1983 864,782 129,573 128,270 73,400 1,196,025 1,328,246 90.0 % 
1984 1,320,904 152,781 571,800 123,974 2,169,459 2,313,565 93.8 % 
1985 1,423,378 124,484 929,600 273,074 2,750,536 2,813,920 97.7 % 
1986 1,262,478 186,535 722,101 378,100 2,549,214 2,730,147 93.4 % 
 
The fact that the government was crucial in promoting the South Korean shipbuilding sector is well 
recognized; but what motivated the government to do this? Two main motivations have been 
mentioned in the literature, one economic and one political.29 The economic argument was that 
light manufactures exports could not be sustained in the long run and that South Korea had to gain a 
competitive edge in more heavy manufactures, such as shipbuilding, in order to maintain economic 
growth. The reason for South Korea‟s reduced competitive advantage within labour-intensive 
production was increasing labour costs. Moreover, there was increased competition from exporters 
that did have lower labour costs such as Malaysia and Thailand. In addition there were increasing 
trade restrictions on textiles to the US, for instance the Voluntary Export Restraints (VER) in 
October 1971.30 This economic motivation originated with the government and President Park in 
particular. His desire to promote heavy manufactures was met by scepticism by the Economic 
Planning Board and international institutions such as the World Bank. 
The political motive behind the promotion of heavy industries was national security. The 
1969 Nixon doctrine stated that the US would become less directly involved in potential future 
armed conflicts in Asia.31 In 1971 Nixon withdrew one third of all US troops from South Korea, and 
this was seen as the start of a full troop withdrawal. Five years later, the newly elected Carter 
administration announced that US troops would be fully withdrawn from South Korea.32 Park saw the 
promotion of South Korea‟s defence industry as a necessary step in maintaining national security. 
                                                 
28 Jonsson (1995:83). 
29 Another motive mentioned by Lee (1991:438) was the confidence that the government got from successful 
planning in the 1960s. A vital element was Park‟s (1970) high regard of the Japanese model of development 
which was seen as a rough blueprint for how to develop South Korea. 
30 See McClenahan (1991:189) and Lee (1991:438). 
31 Lee (1991:437). 
32 Carter‟s policy was eventually suspended in July 1979; see Niksch (1981) for a summary of Carter‟s South 
Korean troop policy. Despite the suspension, Park still felt vulnerable and continued his drive towards military 
security. 
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South Korea‟s proximity to both Mao‟s China and a military superior North Korea would make an 
evaluation of the promotion of heavy industries on pure economic grounds unfair. Park‟s dogged 
promotion of the heavy industries at the end of the 1970s, when the economy was overheated and 
there were clear signs of overcapacity, indicates that political concerns might have dominated the 
economic ones. 
In the 1980s, under the Chun and Woo regimes, state support continued. However, the 
support was less extensive than in the 1970s. State support could be easily defended, as long as 
shipbuilding was expanding, towards the middle of the 1980s. However, towards the end of the 
1980s, several shipbuilding companies started to struggle and the state provided bailouts on the 
grounds that they believed the crisis was temporary. The arguments by the state also indicated that 
shipbuilding had become a sensitive sector, just like in the other shipbuilding countries with a high 
capital stock and high employment, and was simply too big to fail. 
Having briefly reviewed the actual development and the government motivations, we will 
more extensively analyse the roles of industrial policy and technological learning. The industrial 
policy consists both of macro level policies aimed at the shipbuilding sector (and other heavy 
industries) and of micro level state intervention at the company level. Given that this paper looks at 
the ascendency of South Korean shipbuilding, more attention is given to Hyundai Heavy Industries 
than the other companies, given that HHI was first and came to dominate the industry. The 
technological learning was vital for the adoption of shipbuilding technologies, the subsequent 
increase in innovation and the production of higher value-added ships. 
3.1 Industrial policy 
Strong state support has become an important feature of the shipbuilding industry. The sector is 
dependent on the state for at least three reasons. First, the high fixed costs make the 
establishment of shipbuilding capacity virtually impossible without government support, in part 
because competitors from other countries are also relying on government subsidies. Second, 
shipbuilding companies, once established, are often too big to fail and hold positions as important 
employers in regions where job opportunities are limited. Thus, the government is pressured to 
support unprofitable shipbuilding companies. If shipbuilding is a declining domestic industry, 
restructuring is costly as employment is substantial and sector specific capital stock, which has few 
alternative purposes, is high. Finally, related to the other two arguments, the shipbuilding sector is 
sensitive partly because of national security. Therefore, national companies are sometimes forced 
to choose more expensive nationally built ships over cheaper vessels of higher quality to maintain 
the country‟s shipbuilding industry. It is surely the case that a major successful component in 
establishing and maintaining a viable shipbuilding industry is a supportive government.33 
South Korea had attempted to promote the shipbuilding sector before the 1970s. Under the 
Rhee regime, the Shipbuilding Promotion Law from 1958 was a first attempt to stimulate the 
sector.34 Park took power in 1961, and wanted to promote shipbuilding as early as in the Second 
Five Year Development Plan (1967-71), but the EPB persuaded him otherwise. As a compromise, in  
                                                 
33 For a good introduction to this topic, see Cho and Porter (1986). 
34 The Shipbuilding Promotion Law from 1958 included subsidies of 40 % of construction costs, and allowed for 
generous loan repayments. The real problem was the availability of public funds, and the shipbuilding output 
only grew from 4,525 grt in 1959 to 4,674 grt in 1961 (Jonsson 1995:70). 
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1967 the Shipbuilding Promotion Law was introduced which increased the scope of the 1958 law.35 
The main vehicle of promotion had been the then state-owned Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Corporation (KSEC). But the progress had been slow. A number of events triggered a more 
aggressive promotion. First, the already mentioned Nixon doctrine in 1969 and the withdrawal of 
one-third of US troops in 1971. Second, the Yushin constitution in 1972, which suspended 
democracy, gave Park more direct power and allowed the president to override the EPB, thus 
making a more aggressive promotion policy possible.36 
The first detailed reference to the future expansion of the heavy and chemical industries 
(HCIs) was in the Third Five Year Development Plan (1972-76).37 The planned output of shipbuilding 
would be 1.3 million grt by 1976 (Jonsson, 1995:79). But the real promotion of the HCI sectors came 
with the announcement of the HCI plan in January 1973 and its implementation in June the same 
year. As a part of that, the Shipbuilding Development Plan was announced in March 1973 by the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). The plan had several objectives. First, South Korea would be 
self-sufficient in vessels by 1980. Second, shipbuilding exports should reach 1 billion USD by 1980 
(3.2 million grt) and 2 billion USD (6.2 million grt) by 1985. Third, nine shipyards should be 
constructed by 1980 and a further five by 1985. The main means of production would be Hyundai 
Heavy Industries (HHI), even though Daewoo and Samsung would also come to enter the shipbuilding 
market towards the end of the 1970s.38 The Third Five Year Development Plan‟s objective of 1.3 
million grt was eventually not met as production in 1976 was 1,172,000 grt, even though the overall 
shipbuilding capacity was 2.6 million grt. 
The Fourth Five Year Development Plan (1977-81) included a number of objectives for the 
shipbuilding sector. One of these was the commencement of the production of shipping components 
domestically. Another was the development of the Planned Shipbuilding Program, which gave 
guidelines to the shipbuilding sector. Much of the finance of the shipbuilding sector would come 
from the National Investment Fund and foreign loans. Also, government procurement would be used 
to overcome depressed international shipping markets. There was also an increased focus on 
replacing the imports of ships with South Korean-built ships, as there were problems with reaching 
the objective of self-sufficiency by 1980. In fact, the goal would not be reached as about 80 % of 
the additions to South Korea‟s fleet in the early 1980s were imported (Amsden, 1989:271).39 The 
Fourth Five Year Development Plan also made the first major revisions in the shipbuilding targets 
because of the global shipping crisis, as the number of planned shipyards was reduced from nine to 
two. 
The HCI drive provided shipbuilding and other preferred sectors with (i) capital incentives, 
(ii) complementary investments, (iii) trade incentives, and (iv) tax holidays. The capital incentives 
                                                 
35 The Shipbuilding Promotion Law from 1967 was to establish an inquiry commission and set up a basic plan to 
develop shipbuilding by providing capital and implementing government-aid projects. However, previous 
subsidies were abolished, the repayment period of loans shortened and interest rates increased. Because of the 
latter, Hyundai did not regard the law as an improvement (Jonnson 1995:74). 
36 Park was also less dependent foreign aid than in the 1960s because of the economic growth the preceding 
decade. The increased economic power allowed for more independence from not only international 
institutions, but more importantly the US. 
37 An overview of the HCI policies is provided by Lee (1991:431-471). 
38 Park‟s close ties with Hyundai‟s owner Chun probably played a part when Hyundai became the instrument of 
promotion of the shipbuilding industry. 
39 The question was why this policy was not enforced with greater vigour; it would have been easy for the state 
to force South Korean shipping companies to buy domestically built vessels. However, this would most likely 
have stifled the growth of shipping companies, which for the most part were better served by acquiring more 
reasonably priced second-hand ships.  
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included preferential rates from state-owned banks with low nominal rates with the high inflation 
making the real interest rate negative for most of the 1970s.40 A related method for securing access 
to capital was government guarantees for foreign loans. The Foreign Capital Inducement Law states 
that the South Korean government would repay the loans to foreigners if the loans defaulted, for 
examples of such foreign loans for shipbuilding, see table 7. The second category of incentives was 
the government complementary investments which included large infrastructure programmes for 
new facilities. The government invested in industrial complexes for shipbuilding at Ulsan, Okp‟o and 
Chukdo (Kang, 2001:353). Also of great importance was the promotion of the steel industry through 
the state-owned Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation (POSCO). The shipbuilding industry gave POSCO 
increased economies of scale and POSCO gave the shipbuilding industry steel as a vital input at 
comparatively low prices. 
Table 7. Major commercial loan projects, shipbuilding, 1971-8541 
Loan Recipient Projects Country Providing 
Loan 
Contract Value 
(Million) 
Year of Contract 
Validation 
Hyundai Heavy 
Industry 
Ulsan Shipyard 
construction 
UK, Ger., Spain, 
France & Sweden 
50 USD 1971-72 
Daewoo 
Shipbuilding & 
Heavy Machinery 
Okp‟o Shipyard 
construction and 
machine purchase 
UK, Sweden, Den. 
& Fin. 
30 USD; 3 SEK 1978 
Daewoo 
Shipbuilding & 
Heavy Machinery 
Okp‟o Shipyard 
construction and 
machine purchase 
Hong Kong 30 USD 1980 
KSEC 
Construction of 
export ships 
Hong Kong 31 USD 1981 
 
Following the assassination of Park in October 1979 and the ascendancy of the Chun regime in May 
1980, the economic policy changed. The selective targeting of industries was replaced with a more 
functional industrial policy, with support given to research and development (R&D) and training. For 
instance, policy loans for R&D first became the main means for financing private R&D in the 
beginning of the 1980s. The policy loans for R&D in the 1970s had one of the highest interest rates, 
indicating the lower preference for R&D by the government, which resulted in relatively low private 
R&D during the 1970s (Kang, 2001:359). Also, the protection of shipbuilding was reduced, but did 
not disappear. In 1986, the Industry Development Law replaced the Shipbuilding Promotion Law 
from 1967.42 
State support in the shipbuilding sector was often targeted at the company level. The 
government played a large role in the establishment of Hyundai Heavy Industries, although the true 
                                                 
40 See table in appendix 1. 
41 Based on data from Jonsson (1995:80) and Hattori (1997:460-463). 
42 The Industry Development Law of 1986 called for a ‟balanced development‟ with promotion of technological 
development, increased productivity, the efficient allocation of resources, training of the labour force and the 
expansion of a self-reliance basis as the main focus. This was partly because of foreign pressure regarding the 
nature of state support for South Korean shipbuilding. It meant that shipbuilding would follow OECD guidelines 
for deferred export payments. Also, it fixed loan ratios at 8 %, interest rates at 8 % and repayment periods for 
loans was extended to 8,5 years to reduce the extent of direct state support. 
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extent of this support is not entirely known.43 One area of importance was the government‟s 
guarantees for the foreign loans for the construction of the first shipyard at Ulsan. The construction 
of the Ulsan shipyard required a budgeted 67 million USD, with 40 million supplied through foreign 
loans. Foreign lenders were sceptical, but the South Korean government was able to raise 50 million 
USD in foreign loans based on two factors. First, HCC had a proven ability in construction with 
projects completed both domestically and abroad. Second, Hyundai had already managed to get a 
first customer in Greek shipowner George Livanos, and was able to start production as soon as the 
facilities were constructed. 
Government support with orders was also vital. The government support was important in 
winning its first order from Livanos in 1971 as it provided Hyundai with large financial guarantees. 
The order was for two very large crude carriers (VLCCs) of 259,000 dead weight tons (dwt) each. 
Livanos purchased the ships for a price 16 per cent below the world market price and demanded 
they would be exact replica of a ship that had been built at the Scott Lithgow shipyard in Scotland. 
The learning-by-doing and the implementation of foreign technology were undoubtedly useful, but 
there were problems in production which delayed the delivery of the ships. Livanos, as well as 
Japanese and Hong Kong shipowners cancelled orders, which led to government help in finding new 
buyers for the ships. Eventually, the government assisted the establishment of the Hyundai 
Merchant Marine Company in 1976. 
As mentioned, the state did still intervene directly in the 1980s when Daewoo and KSEC had 
severe losses and were threatened by bankruptcies. It showed that Daewoo was simply too big to 
fail as the government arguments for supporting the company rested on protecting jobs and 
communities. Also, the government argued that the problems were short-term. KSEC was eventually 
bought by the conglomerate Hanjin in May 1989 and renamed Hanjin Heavy Industries in 1990. The 
intervention was based on the government‟s expectancy that the recession in the world shipbuilding 
market would be short-term. The government, as it turned out, were right and shipbuilding markets 
started to recover in the 1990s. 
3.2 Technology 
The South Korean shipbuilding sector was technology-dependent in the 1970s, but did manage to 
learn quickly and over time became market leading within technology as well. The technological 
development of South Korean shipbuilding is a key component in explaining the country‟s 
importance in the world‟s shipbuilding market, not only in terms of production, but also in terms of 
technology.44 Hassink and Shin (2005) looked at the transition from foreign technology-dependency 
to innovator and identified that the development of a domestic/local supply base and the growing 
importance of research and development (R&D) and innovations were the main causes. We will 
emphasise three major aspects of the technological development. The first is the technological 
learning and adoption, in particular HHI‟s learning at an early stage. The second is the development 
of human capital, which is of special significance for the shipbuilding industry. The nature of 
technological development in shipbuilding is different from for instance steel. In steel, most of the 
                                                 
43 Amsden (1989:275). 
44 According to Kim (1997:31-32), the HCI drive came earlier than was initially intended as the technological 
capabilities were not yet in place to support the HCI sectors. Within shipbuilding, however, this argument does 
not constitute an argument against the state support shipbuilding received because of the time it took to 
increase technological learning and production capacity. As Amsden (1989:269-290) emphasised, Hyundai Heavy 
Industries (HHI) had a large learning benefits from the 1970s in terms of designs, manpower and market 
positioning which did help position HHI when the market started to expand. South Korea was able to exploit 
the short-term boom in the world shipping market 1979-80, which would have been impossible without the 
increase in shipping capacity during the 1970s. 
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technology is embedded in the capital goods, while in shipbuilding more technology is embedded in 
labour. The third is the building of networks, both in terms of better vertical integration with 
suppliers, but also in terms of sharing technology with other shipbuilders. 
First, South Korean shipbuilding in the 1970s lacked the technological know-how to be 
competitive in international markets and therefore technological assistance from abroad was 
sought.45 Foreign assistance for the Hyundai plant at Ulsan was sought from Britain rather than 
Japan, following the Akazawa Report.46 HHI got four types of technological assistance (Amsden, 
1989:276); (i) dockyard designs from the English company, A&P Appledore; (ii) ship designs and 
operating instructions from Scott Lithgow; (iii) expatriates, European shipbuilders, working for HHI 
the first three years of operations; and (iv) production know-how from Kawasaki Shipbuilding. 
Hyundai had to pay 1.7 million USD to Appledore and Scott Lithgow for the technology acquired by 
them. The link between the South Koreans and Scott Lithgow went back to a previous order of South 
Korean ships at the yard, “so we [Scott Lithgow] were the logical choice when Hyundai and their 
consultants looked around for help. They bought the plans of our current quarter-million-tonner and 
signed a contract to train their key men[.]”47 
At HHI, production know-how improved relatively fast, while design technology, the ability 
to design ships, took longer to master. The production know-how increased through learning-by-
doing in producing multiple types of ships. As mentioned before, the first order was for two VLCCs. 
However, the market for VLCCs collapsed in 1974 and HHI started to take orders for medium and 
small sized vessels and the company managed to accumulate production know-how in the building 
of crude oil tankers, Roll on-Roll off ships, multi-purpose cargo vessels, bulk carriers and container 
ships. Regarding design technology, HHI was dependent on foreign ship designs for most of the 1970s 
even though the company started to acquire basic design abilities from as early as 1974.48 
Gradually, HHI started to experiment with shipping designs and in 1978 a Basic Design Department 
was set up within the company. HHI‟s first self-designed ship was a 25,000 dwt bulk carrier ordered 
by Hyundai Merchant Marine in 1979. In the period 1978 to 1983, Hyundai was actively purchasing 
ship designs from other companies to increase their design technology; see table 8.   
                                                 
45 According to Bae (2002:137-138), Hyundai initially wanted to establish a joint-venture with Mitsubishi in 
January 1969, but could not agree on the terms. Mitsubishi was sceptical to reveal too much to what could be a 
future competitor. Hyundai also sought joint-ventures with the Aker group from Norway and Pan Maritime from 
Israel in October 1969, but these efforts eventually failed. 
46 The Akazawa Report from 1969 was made by a Japanese delegation examining the feasibility of constructing 
heavy industries in South Korea. The conclusion was that a large shipyard was unthinkable and that capacity 
should be expanded gradually. This conclusion did not please the South Korean government and they sought to 
build the shipbuilding sector with less Japanese assistance than originally planned. 
47 Scott Lithgow company magazine, No. 10 (1972:18). 
48 Bae (2002:144-145). 
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Table 8. Hyundai‟s purchased design technology from abroad49 
Design technology Purchased from Time of purchase Price 
80,000 DWT tanker Naiereorm (Ger.) February 1979 281,000 DM 
40,000 DWT bulk carrier and 130,800 DWT 
bulk carrier 
B&W (Den.) March 1982 11,110,000 USD 
45,000 DWT OBO B&W (Den.) October 1982 51,000 USD 
170,000 DWT bulk carrier and 80,000 DWT 
bulk carrier 
BWS (Den.) November 1983 100,000 USD 
Multipurpose cargo carrier NVLaskey (Can.) November 1983 60,000 USD 
 
As one company representative pointed out, “Hyundai Heavy Industries has made strenuous efforts 
to develop specific expertise and technology for the construction of gas carriers, and since 1978 has 
made license agreements with consultant companies to enhance its technological capability in cargo 
tank systems.”50 Other South Korean shipbuilders also choose to use licences as a mean for acquiring 
technology, see table 9 for the case of Samsung. In all 159 licences were purchased by South Korean 
shipbuilders in the period from 1962 to 1987, paying a total of 117 million USD.51 
Table 9. Samsung‟s purchased technology licences from abroad52 
Technology/Areas Partner Period Details 
Managing shipyards B&W (Den.) 3/78-12/84 Management 
Managing shipyards B&W (Den.) 3/81-12/87 Techno. Consulting/ Design Contract 
Managing shipyards IEC (Jap.) 9/87-11/90 Management of Production Process 
Design/ Manufacturing AUTOKON (Nor.) 10/82-11/90 Computer Programmes for Design 
Design/ Manufacturing MARCON (Ger.) 4/83-8/89 Design Technology 
Design/ Manufacturing MONNECKE (Jap.) 4/83-1/92 Design Technology 
Design/ Manufacturing IHI (Jap.) 6/86-6/89 Consulting Production Technology 
Design/ Manufacturing Sanoyath (Jap.) 12/86-12/96 Technological Training 
 
The internal organisation of HHI also evolved over time. The Department of Quality Control was 
established in 1973, with J.B. Park as its first manager. An indicator that the quality of ships 
improved was that the success rate in vessel inspection increased.53 In 1983 HHI had managed to get 
three quality assurance certificates; from Lloyd‟s Register of Shipping, Det Norske Veritas and the 
American Bureau of Shipping. Internationally, only four shipyards were approved by Lloyd‟s and only 
two shipyards were approved by Veritas at the time. This indicated that the quality standard 
reached by HHI had reached an internationally accepted level. The internal organisation of HHI 
                                                 
49 HHI (1992:549-550); paraphrased from Bae (2002:145). 
50 Lee (1989:20). 
51 Gomes-Casseres and Lee (1989:18). 
52 Hassink and Shin (2005:145). 
53 Bae (2002:143-144), citing figures from HHI (1992), points out that vessel inspection increased from 38.1 % in 
1973; to 52.6 % in 1974; to 69.7 % in 1975 and 84.1 % in 1976. Amsden (1989:283) also cited similar figures, but 
it is uncertain whether these are comparable as there was a re-organisation of HHI‟s quality department in 
1978-79. According to Amsden‟s figures the inspection acceptance ratio increased steadily from 87.1 % in 1978 
to 96.1 % in 1985. 
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changed to accommodate the increase in technology-intensity as HHI started to produce higher 
value-added ships in the 1980s. In November 1983 the Hyundai Welding Research Institute was set 
up to improve production technology. Another 1983 establishment was the Hyundai Industrial 
Research Institute (HIRI) which aimed at improving productivity and quality and conducted research 
on for instance welding, material processing and protective coatings. In February 1984 a tank 
experiment station was set up to allow for in-house testing, rather than being dependent on other 
companies. In October 1984 Hyundai Merchant Research Institute was set up to research core 
technologies, for instance ship resistance, propulsion and manoeuvring; engine combustion, 
performance and durability; and hull form.  
The second element crucial to technological development is the development of human 
capital. The increase in the number of engineers is considered vital for the technological catching-
up with leading shipbuilders. As Amsden and Jonsson show, the number of shipbuilding engineers 
had been growing since the 1950s, but many of these were not employed in shipbuilding. Despite 
having sufficient unskilled workers in the 1970s, there was a shortage of skilled workers. HHI did 
have the advantage of being able to recruit shipbuilding engineers from KSEC; getting skilled labour 
from similar position from Hyundai Construction Company and Hyundai Motors; and being able to 
find shipbuilding engineers that were „under-employed‟ elsewhere. This was, however, not enough 
to meet HHIs demand. 
There were three main sources for the increase in human capital. First were the 
expatriates, such as the European engineers who were at HHI in the first three years of operation. 
This included the Dane Kurt J. Schau from Odense shipyard, who became the first president of the 
Ulsan shipyard. At Odense he had been responsible for technology and had long experience in 
constructing VLCCs, and he was also responsible for bringing along many engineers to Ulsan. In 
addition to numerous European engineers there were also more than thirty Japanese engineers from 
Kawasaki Heavy Industries.54 
The second way to increase human capital was to send personnel abroad to train at foreign 
shipyards. In accordance with the deal signed with Appledore and Scott Lithgow, 60 engineers and 
administrative staff would receive overseas training in shipbuilding technology and management 
abilities.55 This was especially useful as the Livanos order was built on the basis of a Scott Lithgow 
blueprint.56 In addition HHI dispatched personnel to train in design at the Sakaiide Shipyard and 
shipyard construction technology at Kashima Construction in Japan. Given that Japan had the 
„state-of-the-art‟ technology on shipyard construction this meant that HHI could leapfrog and learn 
some of the latest technologies of the day, allowing them to acquire global competitiveness quickly. 
The final way to increase human capital was by training personnel at HHI itself. This 
strategy had both short-term and long-term orientation. In the short-term, engineers from various 
backgrounds came to the yard and brought with them their own standards and procedures. A small 
training centre was set up at the start of HHI‟s production and foremen were sent there for one to 
three months to increase uniformity.57 In the long-term, HHI wanted to increase the number of in-
house trained manpower. In September 1972 the company opened up a training centre and Robert 
L. Wilson from Appledore became the director. Upon opening, HHI trained 324 people in various six 
months courses in for instance cutting, plumbing, sheet metal, electricity, machinery work, drawing 
                                                 
54 HHI (1992), 344; paraphrased from Bae (2002:150). 
55 Bae (2002:151). 
56 Scott Lithgow company magazine, No. 10 (1972:18). 
57 Amsden (1989:281). 
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and management. By the end of 1975 a total of 3,636 personnel had been trained, and by 1990 the 
total was 35,234.58 
Another example of human capital development was at Daewoo Shipbuilding and Heavy 
Machinery (DSHM), which was struggling heavily in 1987 because of falling demand and substantial 
labour unrest. Heavy losses in 1988 and 1989 led to the need for government assistance. However, 
the effects of the 1987 labour dispute, in hindsight, might have speeded up technological 
development. New labour measures were implemented which increased technological learning, 
increased cohesion and increased management-worker relationships.59 Small groups of 10-15 
workers went through training programmes and were sent to Japanese manufactures to learn more 
efficient production know-how. Another beneficial element was the re-organising of labour 
schedules that allowed increased flexibility, which again led to increased efficiency. DSHM also re-
organised the dry docks allowing more efficient use of labour by smoothing out workload 
distribution. A number of improvements in production followed, for instance changes that allowed a 
parallel propeller installation, which was more common, and often delayed delivery time. The 
parallel propeller installation allowed for the saving of lead time and allowed for better 
coordination with other operations. 
Finally, the building of linkages was manifested in at least two ways. The first was the 
development of domestic suppliers. Companies could either create their own backward linkages or 
they could use subcontractors. In the 1970s and in the beginning of the 1980s, most key components 
were being imported; towards the end of the 1990s between 70 and 80 per cent of the supply was 
purchased domestically.60 One example was the Hyundai Engine and Heavy Machinery Manufacturing 
Company (HEMCO) which was established in 1978 to make engines and other components for ships.61 
As with HHI, HEMCO‟s learned through foreign technical assistance, overseas training and licences. 
Another example is that most shipbuilding companies have to buy their ship electronics and ship 
navigation systems in the market. Samsung, however, with a strong electronics division was able to 
purchase these components within the group. 
The second linkages were primarily improved technology linkages. From the outset, there 
were linkages with foreign shipbuilders to acquire new technology. In the 1980s, private R&D 
increased, as mentioned before, both through increased policy loans and changes in the internal 
organisation of shipbuilding companies. This also led to increased technological cooperation 
between South Korean shipbuilders, universities, other research institutions and suppliers. While 
these exchanges were started in the 1980s, they evolved into the 1990s to a large network.62 Also, 
South Korean shipbuilders have a lot of lobby power through co-operation. The Korea Shipbuilders' 
Association (KOSHIPA) was founded on July 19, 1977 and functioned as an organised lobby group to 
promote shipbuilders interests. 
 
                                                 
58 Boa (2002:152). 
59 Upton and Kim (1994). 
60 Hassink and Shin (2005:146-148). 
61 Amsden (1989:279-280). 
62 Hassink and Shin (2005:148-151). 
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4. Rising in a sunset industry 
 
What was the basis for the success of the South Korean shipbuilding industry? Three important 
points emerge from the analysis of the international and domestic dimensions above. First, South 
Korea managed to acquire a large share of the world shipbuilding market, expanding rapidly in a 
period when capacity was being reduced in all major shipbuilding nations. Second, the influence of 
the South Korean authorities was substantial, with the industry placed prominently in the 
governments‟ plans for long-term economic development. Third, South Korea managed to 
continuously develop and upgrade its production processes, sustaining its initial cost advantages 
through rationalization and innovation. We might combine these elements to discuss to which 
extent the shipping glut and the plight of the yards in traditional shipbuilding nations might have 
been beneficial for the South Korean shipbuilding industry. Was it easier for South Korean yards to 
establish themselves in a declining, rather than a booming, market? 
 There are four elements; all of which are related to the shipping and shipbuilding crises, 
which are likely to have affected the ascendancy of South Korean shipbuilding in a beneficial 
manner. First, the shipping crisis led to an increased emphasis on the price of new ships. Second, 
the shipping crisis, and the concomitant economic difficulties of shipping companies, enabled South 
Korean owners to gain market shares by offering novel financing solutions. Third, the large amount 
of subsidies in Western Europe probably strained the willingness of the authorities in traditional 
shipbuilding countries to compete with the newcomers. Finally, the crisis is likely to have improved 
the South Korean yards‟ access to technology and know-how.  
First, the subdued rates in the shipping market made shipowners preoccupied with the 
question of costs. The problematic conditions in the shipping sector may have helped South Korea‟s 
entry through two mechanisms; market penetration and cost focus. With regard to market 
penetration, the crisis may have made it easier for the yards to acquire customers within the 
relatively tight networks of the shipping world. When freight rates are high and the shipping market 
is booming, the market for ships is a sellers‟ market, where shipowners are willing to pay a premium 
to get ships delivered rapidly and maintain existing customer relationships with preferred yards. 
During a shipping depression, however, the market for ships becomes a buyers‟ market. The low 
freight rates implied that shipping companies could not justify paying extra for tonnage from old 
business relations. This is linked to the cost focus. During the crisis, price was the one factor that 
determined where shipowners ordered vessels, an element that is likely to have helped South 
Korean yards. In a similar vein, uncertainty regarding the yards‟ ability to deliver the ships on time 
is something that shipowners are willing to pay a lot to avoid during booms. In a depressed market, 
delays are much less costly for shipowners, thus again having an adverse effect on the owners‟ 
willingness to pay extra to order at established yards.  
 Second, the difficult financial situation of many shipping companies made novel financing 
solutions a necessity. In this respect, a number of owners were able to acquire new tonnage by 
entering into a bareboat charter with a South Korean yard (the legal owner of the vessel), and 
combine this with a purchase option. Thus, the owners‟ need for financing was limited, but they 
would get control of the tonnage and be able to purchase it “properly” when the market and the 
financial situation had improved.63 An added bonus for the shipowners was the fact that the ships 
could utilise low-cost foreign labour, which would have been impossible in a number of European 
                                                 
63 Thowsen & Tenold (2006:447-448). 
  
22 
 
countries with strict manning requirements. Table 11 shows that such arrangements were fairly 
common for a number of vessel types. 
 
Table 11. Vessels on bareboat charter with purchase options, 198464 
 
General 
cargo 
Container 
ships 
Log 
carriers 
Bulk 
carriers 
Chemical 
tankers 
Oil 
tankers 
Sum 
Number 21 6 4 20 4 4 59 
Grt 176,882 80,420 14,819 359,436 6,163 364,607 1,002,327 
 
   
Third, the financial resources transferred to the yards from the authorities in Western European 
countries at the earlier stages of the crisis were enormous. This element is important for three 
reasons. First, the support stifled efficiency improvements and enabled European yards to maintain 
their relatively low productivity. Second, the expensive subsidies paid out in the period before the 
market improved occurred against a backdrop of reduced activity, and cash-strapped European 
governments were unlikely to provide even more financial support to the sector. Finally, the 
extensive use of subsidies by the governments in traditional shipbuilding nations implies that the 
criticism of the government support in South Korea was much more muted than would otherwise 
have been the case. Moreover, the crisis may have hindered South Korean costs from escalating, as 
the low price of newbuildings led to a clear focus on productivity.65  
 Finally, the availability of technology and competence may have been improved as a result 
of the crisis. European yards, unable to build ships at a profit, were able – and willing – to sell their 
services. As such, the technology transfer from traditional yards might be considered a reflection of 
the fact that although they were unable to secure orders for new ships, at least they had something 
– knowledge – to sell.  
The length of the shipping crisis was a blessing in disguise for South Korea‟s shipbuilders. 
Had the crisis been shorter, the reduction of production capacity in Europe, and the amount of 
support paid out to European yards, would have been lower. If this were the case, it is likely that 
South Korean yards would have faced much more fierce competition, both during the temporary 
improvement of newbuilding orders in 1979-80, and in the second half of the 1980s. 
5. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper has been to look more closely into the factors that enabled South Korea to 
grasp substantial market shares in the shipbuilding industry in the 1970s and 1980s. There is no 
doubt that the role of the South Korean government in supporting the venture was crucial, but we 
have also emphasised that it is likely that the scale and the length of the shipping and shipbuilding 
crisis was beneficial. The traditional shipbuilders in Western Europe were plagued by high wages, 
relative to productivity, which sounded the death-knell of most of the European shipbuilding. 
Consequently, European shipowners‟ shift of focus from Europe to Asia was encouraged by lower 
prices, better delivery times and more beneficial financial terms.  
                                                 
64 Institute of Shipping Economics (1984a). 
65 There is of course also the possibility that by investing heavily in new capacity and accepting losses through 
aggressive pricing, the Asian yards were able to see off their European competitors.    
  
23 
 
 Today, it seems likely that the shipbuilding sector again is suffering from substantial 
overcapacity. The development has been much the same as that of the 1970s – rapid growth of 
shipyard capacity, linked to a boom in the shipping market – followed by a collapse of shipbuilding 
orders amongst historically high orderbooks. This time around, however, the low labour cost, 
government-sponsored challenger is China, while South Korea‟s position is similar to that of the 
established builders – Japan and Europe – in the 1970s. 
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Appendix 1 
Nominal versus real interest rates, per cent, 1963-199966 
 Nominal interest rate Rate of inflation Real interest rate Household Savings Ratio 
 Bank (A) Kerb Market (B) C (A-C) (B-C)  
1963-69 22,5 56,4 18,1 4,4 38,3 4,0 
1970-79 16,5 41,7 19,2 -2,7 22,4 10,5 
1980-89 11,2 28,0 7,8 3,4 20,2 15,3 
1990-99 9,8 21,2 6,0 3,8 15,2 16,0 
 
                                                 
66 Data from Song (2003:190-191). 
